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A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX'
HE United States Supreme Court's decision in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota2 dealt a serious blow to states' use tax collection efforts on
out-of-state mail order sales. North Dakota, like many other states
(including Texas3), enacted legislation compelling businesses that regularly
and systematically solicit sales in the state to collect the state's use tax irre-
spective of whether such businesses had any physical presence in the state.4
Pursuant to this legislation, North Dakota sought to require Quill to collect
North Dakota use tax on Quill's mail order sales in the state. Quill, which
did not have any physical presence in North Dakota, generated approxi-
mately $1,000,000 in annual sales of office equipment and supplies to North
Dakota customers through mail solicitations, telephone calls and advertise-
ments in national periodicals. Quill shipped these goods from out-of-state to
North Dakota customers by common carrier or mail. The Court addressed
whether North Dakota's collection efforts were constitutionally permissible
under both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause.
A quarter of a century ago, the Court held in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue of Illinois5 that a seller whose only connection with
customers in the state was by common carrier or mail lacked the requisite
minimum contacts with the state to justify imposing use tax collection obli-
gations upon the seller. 6 In spite of Bellas Hess, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held the state statute to be constitutional, reasoning that comprehen-
sive changes in the economy, technology and the law made Bellas Hess obso-
lete.7 Whereas the mail order business was a small market niche in 1967, it
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist Uni-
versity. Partner, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Hughes & Luce, L.L.P., Dallas,
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1. Cases, regulations and other developments that fell within this Survey period but were
included in last year's Survey article are not included in this article. See Cynthia M.
Ohlenforst & Jeff W. Dorrill, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 2093 (1992).
2. 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
3. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.008(b)(5) (Vernon 1992).
4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (1991 Supp.).
5. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
6. Id. at 758.




had grown to a $180 billion business by 1989.8 Moreover, the North Dakota
Supreme Court concluded that advances in technology greatly eased the bur-
den of use tax collection compliance by mail order businesses.9 In support of
its conclusion that the legal landscape has changed since 1967, the North
Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that cases such as Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady'° are evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court no longer
mandates the physical-presence test suggested in Bellas Hess. "
While admitting that it had always not made a clear distinction between
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause, the United States
Supreme Court held that a bright-line physical-presence test must be met
under the Commerce Clause in order to subject an out-of-state vendor to a
state's sales and use tax laws,' 2 but that such physical presence is not re-
quired to satisfy the Due Process Clause.13 Thus, the Court distinguished
between the "substantial nexus" requirement under the Commerce Clause
and the "minimum contacts" requirement for due process purposes. In
making this distinction, the Court reasoned that due process centrally con-
cerns the fundamental fairness of a governmental activity, 14 while the Com-
merce Clause's nexus requirement should focus on a state law's effect on the
national economy rather than equity for the individual taxpayer.' 5
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court in In re Al Copeland Enterprises, Inc. 16 held
that Texas sales taxes collected by a debtor corporation are not part of the
debtor's estate but are trust funds for the State of Texas, even if such
amounts are commingled with non-trust fund assets. 17 The debtor owed the
State of Texas over $1,000,000 from sales tax collections. As the debtor
collected these taxes, he deposited them in a bank account, which account
was later swept into a central clearing account that contained funds gener-
ated from various other sources. Section 111.016 of the Tax Code provides
that any person collecting a state tax holds the collected amounts in trust for
8. Id. at 208-09.
9. Id. at 215.
10. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
11. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 216.
12. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1914-16. It still remains unclear, however, how much physical
presence in a state is necessary in order for an entity to have a substantial nexus with the state.
13. Id. at 1910-11. The Court overruled Bellas Hess to the extent it interpreted the Due
Process Clause to require physical presence in a state for the imposition of tax collection obli-
gations. Id. at 1911.
The dissent stated that Bellas Hess should be overruled in its entirety. Id. at 1918 (White, J.,
dissenting). The dissent based its conclusion on its belief that (1) the substantial nexus test and
the minimum contacts requirement are essentially the same, and (2) the substantive underpin-
nings of Bellas Hess have been dissolved in later decisions. Id. at 1918-20.
14. Id. at 1913.
15. Id. By holding that North Dakota's collection efforts violate the Commerce Clause
but not the Due Process Clause, the Court has cleared the way for Congress to pass legislation
allowing states to compel out-of-state businesses to collect use tax on sales to customers in the
taxing state.
16. 133 B.R. 837 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991).
17. Id. at 842. See also In re Gulf Consol. Servs., Inc., 110 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1989) (debtor's obligation to state for sales tax collected was held as a "trust fund," entitling
the state to a priority claim).
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the state's benefit.' 8 In addressing whether the commingling of such
amounts affects the status of the collections as trust funds, the court com-
pared the language of Section 111.016 to a similarly worded federal tax stat-
ute (Section 7501 of the Internal Revenue Code' 9) providing that federal tax
collections are held in trust for the United States. Courts have held that
amounts held in trust for the United States under Section 7501 do not lose
their trust status merely because such amounts are commingled with non-
trust funds if the aggregate commingled funds equals or exceeds the trust
fund amounts at all times between collection of taxes and the bankruptcy
filing. 20
As during past Survey periods, the comptroller issued numerous adminis-
trative decisions. A brief overview of a few of these noteworthy decisions
highlights some recurring issues and changes or clarifications in comptroller
policy. Decision No. 27,33621 rejected the comptroller's long-standing pol-
icy of applying sales tax rate increases to operating lease payments received
after the effective date of the rate increase. 22 In what appears to be, surpris-
ingly, an issue of first impression, the comptroller considered whether the
Texas Legislature intended for the leasing of property to be treated as a
single sale or as a series of sales. The comptroller concluded that an operat-
ing lease represents only one taxable event, which occurs upon the execution
and delivery of possession of the leased property. 23 Thus, each rental pay-
ment is taxed at the sales tax rate in effect on the date the lease is
consummated. 24
18. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon 1992).
19. I.R.C. § 7501 (1988).
20. Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53 (1990); In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 817 F.2d 682 (10th
Cir. 1987).
21. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,336 (Sept. 10, 1991).
22. Id. The Tax Division pointed to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.408 (Vernon 1992) in
support of its argument that each lease payment should be subject to the sales tax rate in effect
at the time the payment is made. Section 151.408 provides that a taxpayer whose regular
books are kept on an accounting basis that accurately reflects the taxpayer's business opera-
tions may file sales tax reports on the same basis that is used for the taxpayer's regular books.
Id. Thus, if a taxpayer books lease income on a monthly basis, the comptroller cannot require
the taxpayer to pay the sales tax upfront on all lease payments. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.294(f)(3)(A) (eff. Dec. 6, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 6756). Therefore, based on the fact that
§ 151.408 allows taxpayers to pay sales tax on leases as lease payments are made, the Tax
Division argued that sales tax should be charged on each lease payment at the rate in effect at
the time the payment is made. The comptroller found absolutely no relationship between the
provisions of § 151.408 and the issue of when a "sale" occurs for sales tax purposes. Comp-
troller Hearing No. 27,336 (Sept. 10, 1991). This decision appears consistent with the comp-
troller's policy of requiring outstanding sales tax liability to be accelerated when a lease is
factored or assigned (see 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.294); the comptroller's justification for
acceleration is, in part, that the entire tax was due on the sale date, and that payment over time
is permitted merely by grace. In determining that each lease payment is taxed at the rate in
effect on the date the payment is made, the comptroller was influenced by decisions in other
states addressing similar issues. For example, in Hansord Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Taxation, 199 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 1972), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that, for Min-
nesota sales tax purposes, a "sale" includes a lease transaction; given that the rights of the
lessor and the lessee were irrevocably fixed at the time the lease is entered into, a new "sale"
does not occur each time a rental payment is paid. Id. at 824.




In Decision No. 28,727,25 the comptroller addressed Section 151.304(b)(2)
of the Tax Code, which exempts from sales tax the sale of the entire operat-
ing assets of a separate division, branch or identifiable segment of a com-
pany.26 Rule 3.316(d)(2) provides that this exemption does not apply to a
sale unless the income and expenses attributable to the division, branch, or
segment could be separately established from the seller's books of account or
record. 27 In this decision, a bank sold all of its equipment that was used in
its data processing bureau. The data processing bureau had two internal
cost centers, one for customer service and the other for actual data process-
ing operations. Although both cost centers had expenses, only the data
processing cost center had any income that could be separately established
from the bank's books and records. The taxpayers regularly combined the
income and expenses from these two cost centers into one "report." The
comptroller ruled that the sale constituted an occasional sale because the
service bureau, as a whole, had both income and expenses on the taxpayer's
books and records.28
The comptroller addressed in Decision No. 28,44129 the difficult question
of how the sale for resale exemption applies to taxable services. The comp-
troller ruled that data processing services used to assist a debt collector in
keeping track of payments made by debtors were not purchased for resale.30
In order for a service to be purchased for resale, the service must be resold as
an integral part of a taxable service.3 ' The comptroller ruled that these data
processing services were not an integral part of the debt collection service
because, although the data processing services made the debt collection job
easier, the debt collection services could be performed without relying on the
data processing services.32
25. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,727 (July 13, 1992).
26. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2) (Vernon 1992).
27. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316(d)(2) (eff. Dec. 24, 1984, 9 Tex. Reg. 6188).
28. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,727 (July 13, 1992). The comptroller appeared to be
influenced strongly by the fact that the seller regularly prepared the report combining income
and expenses from both cost centers. Id.
29. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,441 (Oct. 14, 1992). In another decision addressing the
sale for resale exemption, the comptroller ruled in Decision No. 27,359 that a wholesale gro-
cery business could not accept in good faith a resale certificate from a grocery store on a
purchase of a gas pump hose since such an item is not typically sold in a grocery store, but that
the wholesale business could accept resale certificates for the purchase of catalogs, card files,
fluoroscent lamps and light bulbs since such items might be sold in a grocery store. Comptrol-
ler Hearing No. 27,359 (June 26, 1991). The comptroller pointed out in this decision that
sellers are not expected to police purchasers that give them resale certificates so long as the
certificates appear to be valid on their face. Id.
30. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,441 (Oct. 14, 1992).
31. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.006, 151.302 (Vernon 1992).
32. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,441 (Oct. 14, 1992). Decision No. 27,715 involves simi-
lar facts to those presented in Decision No. 28,441. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,715 (Dec. 9,
1991). In Decision No. 27,715, a debt collection company that contracted with merchants
claimed an exemption from taxation on stationery services (used in preparing debt collector's
pre-printed notice forms), skip tracing services and data processing services the company used
to collect returned checks. The comptroller ruled that, while the skip tracing services qualified
for the resale exemption because they were an integral part of the debt collection services, both
the stationery services and the data processing services were taxable. Id.
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Decision No. 27,66333 also addressed the sales tax on debt collection serv-
ices. The taxpayer contracted with businesses to collect on returned checks
received by the businesses. 34 The taxpayer's contract with the businesses
provided that a fifteen dollar service charge would be added to the face
amount of each check placed with the taxpayer for collection and that upon
collection, the taxpayer would be allowed to retain ten dollars of the addi-
tional fifteen dollar charge, with the remaining five dollars remitted to the
businesses.35 In asserting that tax is due on the entire fifteen dollar charge,
the Tax Division relied on Rule 3.354(b)(3), which states that the writer of a
dishonored check is responsible for paying the cost incurred to process the
check, including sales tax due on the debt collection service.36 Thus, the Tax
Division argued that the cost incurred to process the check is the full fifteen
dollar charge. The comptroller disagreed, reasoning that only the amount
retained by the taxpayer (ten dollars) was subject to the debt collection ser-
vice tax because that amount represented the price of the taxpayer's
service.37
Decision No. 26,67238 addressed what appears to be clever tax planning
designed to circumvent Section 151.007(a)(3) of the Tax Code, which pro-
vides that charges for transportation of tangible personal property are in-
cluded in the sales price. 39 The taxpayer and each customer agreed that title
to goods would pass to the customer on the invoice date, that the customer
would pay a nominal storage fee for the taxpayer's holding the property after
sale, and that the taxpayer would deliver the goods by common carrier. The
taxpayer argued that it should not be responsible for collecting sales taxes on
the transportation charges because it had arranged for transportation of the
tangible property in its capacity as bailee rather than as seller of the prop-
erty. The comptroller ruled that because the taxpayer's customers clearly
anticipated that the taxpayer would ultimately deliver the goods, the trans-
portation of the goods was connected with the goods' sale and not their
storage.4o
Decision No. 27,65941 addressed whether an assignment of an operating
lease to a third party was a financing arrangement or a factoring. The dis-
tinction is important because if a lease is factored, sales tax is due on all
remaining lease payments.42 This issue is ripe for controversy, given that the
comptroller's rules are not particularly lucid in defining a lease factoring and
that prior decisions have been inconsistent. In this case, the taxpayer
purchased equipment, leased the equipment to third parties, and then as-
signed the lease agreement to a financing company. The Tax Division as-
33. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,663 (Oct. 29, 1991).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.354(b)(3) (eff. Dec. 11, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 8332).
37. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,663 (Oct. 29, 1991).
38. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,672 (Feb. 7, 1991).
39. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007(a)(3) (Vernon 1992).
40. Comptroller Hearing No. 26,672 (Feb. 7, 1991).
41. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,659 (Apr. 29, 1992).
42. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.294(h) (eff. Dec. 6, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 6756).
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serted that the leases were factored because (1) the agreement with the
financing company described the arrangement as an assignment, (2) the as-
signments were non-recourse, and (3) the taxpayer never produced any loan
agreements or promissory notes. The taxpayer suggested that the assign-
ments with the financing company represented loans because (1) the tax-
payer retained title to the equipment, (2) the taxpayer was authorized in the
agreement with the financing company to borrow from the financing com-
pany certain sums, and (3) UCC- l's were sometimes filed. The comptroller
ruled that the transaction more closely resembled an assignment rather than
a loan, although it recognized that the distinction was difficult to make.43
In Decision No. 28,461, 44 the comptroller ruled that a lump sum sales
price for a roofing contract did not include sales tax even though the
purchase order provided the price "includes labor, materials and tax."'45
The comptroller based its decision on two factors. First, neither the original
price proposal nor any invoices contained any reference to state taxes. 46 Sec-
ond, the references in the purchase order to the inclusion of tax could relate
either to the taxes the roofer paid to its suppliers for materials used on the
job or to the tax that was due on the actual roofing job.4 7 Given these two
possibilities, the language should be interpreted against the taxpayer because
the roofer did not hold a sales tax permit.48
B. STATE TAX REGULATIONS
The ongoing process of issuing and amending sales tax regulations contin-
ued throughout the Survey period. Rule 3.291, addressing sales tax respon-
sibilities of contractors, was amended to reflect 1991 legislation narrowing
the sales tax exemption for property used to improve an exempt organiza-
43. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,659 (Apr. 29, 1992).
44. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,461 (Aug. 24, 1992).
45. Id. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,166 (Apr. 6, 1992) concerns facts similar to those
presented in Decision No. 28,461. In Decision No. 28,166, the taxpayer contracted with a
roofing company to repair and modify the roof of a hotel the taxpayer owned. The contract
with the roofing company provided that the lump sum sales price "includes all labor, materi-
als, taxes and permits." Id. The taxpayer asserted that because the contract provided that the
sales price included all taxes, the sales price must have included sales tax; therefore, by paying
the lump sum price, the taxpayer had paid all sales taxes due. The comptroller ruled that the
inclusion of the term "taxes" in the contract was most likely a reference to the taxes the roofer
believed it would have to pay to vendors for materials and equipment purchased or rented for
use in completing the job. Id. As in Decision No. 28,461, the comptroller appeared to be
heavily influenced by the fact that the roofer did not have a sales tax permit. Id.
46. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,461 (Aug. 24, 1992).
47. Id.
48. Id. This decision makes clear that if sales tax is to be included in the overall price,
invoices, contracts, and purchase orders should clearly document such fact.
Decision No. 28,468 provides guidance with respect to how the comptroller differentiates
between real property maintenance (which is not a taxable service) and the repair of non-
residential real property (which is a taxable service). In this case, the taxpayer determined that
the caulk in its building was allowing moisture penetration and hired a water-proofing com-
pany to remove and replace the old caulk. The comptroller ruled that the work performed by
the water-proofing company was not maintenance and was a taxable real property restoration
service because the work was neither scheduled nor periodic work. Comptroller Hearing No.
28,468 (Nov. 2, 1992).
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tion's realty and to provide further guidance with respect to the taxability of
materials incorporated into property. 49 In keeping with the changes made to
Section 151.311 of the Tax Code,50 Rule 3.291 now provides that contrac-
tors improving realty for school districts or non-profit or public hospitals
may obtain an exemption certificate with respect to property purchased by
them in connection with such projects. 5 Under the prior rule (and prior
law), tangible personal property used to improve the realty of any entity
organized by the state, county, city or any other political subdivision was
exempt. 52 Amended Rule 3.291, however, expressly allows exempt organi-
zations to purchase materials incorporated into a facility tax-free through
the use of separated contracts.5 3 Rule 3.291 now defines the term "consum-
able items," and provides when such items may be purchased tax-free. 54
The rule also provides additional guidance on what constitutes a separated
contract. 5 For example, the rule makes clear that the terms of the contract
will control over the terms of a bid.5 6 The rule also sets forth guidelines
taxpayers must meet in order to purchase tax-free tangible personal property
that is intended to be incorporated into a facility dedicated to a governmen-
tal entity. 57
The comptroller made substantial revisions to Rule 3.294, which ad-
dresses sales tax consequences of rentals and leases of tangible personal
property. 58 Amended Rule 3.294 provides more guidance concerning as-
signments of operating leases. The rule now provides that if a lessor (1)
assigns to a third party the lessor's rights to receive all lease payments due
under a lease agreement, and (2) transfers title to the leased property, then
the third party purchaser must begin collecting tax on the remaining rental
49. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291 (eff. July 23, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 4955).
50. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon 1992).
51. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291(c).
52. Id. § 3.291(c)(1) (11 Tex. Reg. 4930) (amended July 23, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 4955).
53. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291(e)(3).
54. Id. § 3.29 1(a)(2), (b)(2). Consumable items may be purchased tax-free by a contractor
if they are transferred to the contractor's customer at or before the time the contractor takes
possession of such items where practicable and if the items are immediately marked or physi-
cally identified as the customer's property, and the contractor separately states the charges for
the consumable items. Id. § 3.291(b)(2)(B).
55. Id. § 3.291(b)(4).
56. Id. § 3.291(b)(5). The rule also provides that the terms of a contract will prevail over
the terms of a change order for purposes of determining whether the change order is a lump-
sum or separated contract. Id. Comptroller representatives have stated, however, that this
change-order provision (which constitutes a change in policy) will not affect change-orders to
contracts that were executed prior to the effective date of the rule.
57. Id. § 3.291(f). A contractor may purchase tax-free tangible personal property used to
improve real property that will be ultimately dedicated to a governmental entity if (1) the
contract between the contractor and the private party is a separated contract, (2) the contract
provides that title to the materials passes to the private party when the materials are delivered
to the job site and before they are incorporated into the realty or used by the contractor or the
private entity, and (3) the contract provides that the private party intends to donate the prop-
erty to the governmental entity before it is incorporated into the realty or used by the contrac-
tor. Id.
58. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.294 (eff. Dec. 6, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 6756).
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charges. 59 However, the third party may issue a resale certificate to the orig-
inal lessor so that the third party is not required to pay sales tax on the
amount it paid to the original lessor for the leased property.60 Many of the
other changes clarify the application of sales tax to the leasing of tangible
personal property with an operator. 6 1 The revised rule also specifies that
damage waiver fees are taxable. 62 Whereas the prior rule did not address
transportation charges, the revised rule provides that all transportation
charges billed by the lessor to the lessee that are related to the leased prop-
erty are taxable, but that charges for transportation billed directly to the
lessee by third party carriers are not taxable.63
New Rule 3.314 addresses sales and use tax consequences of wrapping,
packing, and packaging supplies." The rule provides that sales and use tax
is not due on containers or packaging supplies purchased by manufacturers
for use as part of the manufacturing completion process. 65 The manufactur-
ing process is complete when the property being produced has been pack-
aged by the manufacturer as it will be sold. 66 Sales tax is due on packaging
supplies, such as gift wrapping supplies, sold to persons who repack the tan-
gible personal property prior to sale. Additionally, sales tax is due on pack-
aging supplies sold to produce shippers who are not original producers,
wholesalers, retailers and service providers for use in delivering or furthering
the performance of a service or the rental or sale of tangible personal prop-
erty. 67 The rule does provide, however, that if a business that primarily
manufactures tangible personal property for sale also purchases for resale
tangible personal property manufactured by another entity, the business may
purchase all of its packaging supplies tax-free even though a portion of such
supplies are used in repackaging another product. 68
Rule 3.298, addressing amusement services, was amended by adding non-
profit country clubs to the list of amusement services.69 The amended rule
also provides that amusements are taxable if they are provided jointly by a
for-profit organization and by a governmental entity. 70
During the Survey period, the comptroller continued to enact rules ad-
59. Id. § 3.294(i). Amended Rule 3.294 also makes clear that all oral leases will be
treated as operating leases rather than as financing leases. Id. § 3.294(a)(4).
60. Id. § 3.294(i).
61. Id. § 3.294(c).
62. Id. § 3.294(d)(2).
63. Id. § 3.294(d)(3). Rule 3.294 was also amended to provide specific guidance with
respect to the obligations of an out-of-state lessor deriving rental receipts from tangible per-
sonal property located in Texas. Id. § 3.294(f)(3)(C).
64. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.314 (eff. July 23, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 4958).
65. Id. § 3.314(b)(1).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 3.314(c).
68. Id. § 3.314(e). For example, the rule provides that fast-food restaurants are generally
treated as primarily engaged in processing of tangible personal property for sale. Thus, a fast-
food restaurant may purchase tax-free not only the containers used for the food it processes,
but it may also purchase tax-free the containers used for other items it sells, such as soft drinks
or candy. Id. § 3.291(e)(1).
69. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.298(a)(l)(G) (eff. Sept. 29, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 6372).
70. Id. § 3.298(h)(2).
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dressing 1989 and 1991 sales tax legislation. For example, Rule 3.300 was
amended to reflect 1991 legislation that delayed the phasing in of the sales
and use tax exemption for certain manufacturing equipment. 71 Rule 3.345
was added to address 1989 legislation that provides a refund to qualified
businesses buying equipment and machinery to be used in an enterprise
zone.72 Amended Rule 3.356 provides a definition of "temporary help serv-
ices," which cannot be taxed as real property services under 1989 legisla-
tion.73 Amended Rule 3.297 addresses the exemption added in 1989 for
certain aircraft items and services. 74 Amended Rule 3.286 now reflects 1989
legislation that expanded the definition of "seller" and "retailer" and elimi-
nated the sales tax permit fee. 75 Rule 3.329 was amended to reflect 1991
legislation that altered the sales tax incentive for enterprise projects creating
new jobs. 76
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. LIABILITY FOR TAX - DOING BUSINESS IN TEXAS AND
PUBLIC LAW 86-272
As revised in 1991, the franchise tax is now comprised of two components:
a tax on capital77 and a tax on "earned surplus."'78 Although Sharp v. House
of Lloyd, Inc. 79 established that a corporation may become subject to the
Texas franchise tax by effecting in-state sales through independent contrac-
tors, the income from such sales may, in some circumstances, be partially
shielded from the franchise tax. 80 Because the tax on earned surplus is, in
substance if not in name, an income tax, Public Law 86-272,81 which limits
states' ability to tax companies whose only state contacts are certain solicita-
tions or orders, limits Texas' ability to impose a tax on the earned surplus of
an entity whose only ties to Texas are certain limited solicitation activities
conducted by independent contractors. Accordingly, the United States
Supreme Court's focus on "solicitation of orders" as used in Public Law 86-
272 in Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr. Co.8 2 will
impact the scope and administration of Texas' tax on earned surplus.
The Wrigley case noted that the Wrigley company sold gum in Wisconsin,
but had no real property, telephone listing or bank accounts in Wisconsin,
and did not operate any manufacturing, training or warehouse facilities in
71. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300(h) (eff. Feb. 5, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 473).
72. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.345 (eff. July 9, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 4611).
73. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356(a)(10), (b) (eff. Dec. 6, 1991, 16 Tex. Reg. 6760).
74. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.297(d) (eff. Jan. 28, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 324).
75. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286(a)(1), (a)(3), (c)(1) (eff. Mar. 6, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg.
1744).
76. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.329 (eff. Apr. 17, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 2403).
77. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.002(a)(1); 171.101 (Vernon 1992).
78. Id. §§ 171.002(a)(2); 171.110.
79. 815 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1991).
80. Id. at 249.
81. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84
(1988)).
82. 112 S. Ct. 2447 (1992).
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the state. The company, which employed salesmen to solicit sales in Wis-
consin, argued that its Wisconsin activities were limited to "solicitation of
orders" within the meaning of Public Law 86-272, and that it was therefore
immune from Wisconsin franchise taxes. The state asserted that a company
forfeits its Public Law 86-272 protection if it engages in "any activity other
than requesting the customer to purchase the product. ' 83 The Court ac-
cepted neither the state's narrow construction nor Wrigley's broad interpre-
tation under which solicitation would include any activities that are
"ordinary and necessary 'business activities' accompanying the solicitation
process" or are "routinely associated with deploying a sales force ... so long
as there is no office, plant, warehouse or inventory in the state."'84 Instead,
the Court sought to find the line between activities that are "entirely ancil-
lary" to requests for purchase and those that the company would engage in
anyway,8 5 while making clear that certain de minimus activities would not
result in losing the statutory protection. 6 Finding that, on the facts before
the Court, Wrigley's replacement of stale gum, supplying gum through stock
checks, and storing gum in state were neither ancillary nor de minimus, 87
the Court upheld Wisconsin's right to tax the company.
The Court's failure to provide a bright-line test ensures additional litiga-
tion, and Texas taxpayers may well be among those to look to the court-
house for guidance.
B. CALCULATION AND ALLOCATION OF TAXABLE CAPITAL
Taxpayers continue to challenge, but with limited success in administra-
tive hearings, the comptroller's determination of surplus. In Decision
27,758, for example, the comptroller ruled that the taxpayer could not de-
duct future operating lease obligations from surplus for purposes of calculat-
ing its franchise tax liability for years after the 1987 legislative changes to the
franchise tax. 88 The taxpayer relied on the Section 171.109(a)(3) definition
of debt as "any legally enforceable obligation." 89 The administrative law
judge concluded, however, that allowing the taxpayer to deduct (as a debt)
its operating lease obligations without taking into surplus (as an asset) the
83. Id. at 2454 (citing Brief For Petitioner at 21). Wisconsin further argued that no post-
sale activities could be included within the scope of solicitation. Id. at 2457.
84. Id. at 2455 (citing Brief For Respondent at 9, 19-20).
85. Id. at 2456.
86. Id. at 2458.
87. Id. at 2459-60. This finding is particularly interesting given the fact that only
0.00007% of Wrigley's annual Wisconsin sales were from stock checks. The Court concluded,
by contrast, that Wrigley's in-state recruitment, training and evaluation of sales representa-
tives, using hotels and homes for sales meetings, and certain credit-dispute interventions were
ancillary to solicitation. Id.
88. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,758 (Mar. 12, 1992).
89. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992). This definition, enacted
in 1989, is intended to limit taxpayers' ability to reduce taxable surplus; thus, the definition
excludes from "debt" obligations that do not constitute fixed, legally enforceable obligations,
even if the obligations are characterized as liabilities for generally accepted accounting
purposes.
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value of the lease would distort the taxpayer's financial condition.90 This
interesting decision fails to reconcile its conclusion with the statutory defini-
tion of debt. The comptroller subsequently reached the same conclusion in a
hearing that involved refund claims for years prior to the 1987 legislative
changes. 91
In Decision 27,866, the comptroller held that a corporation could not
write off, for franchise tax purposes, the value of its shell subsidiaries. 92 The
taxpayer argued that it was writing off permanently worthless assets, as al-
lowed by Tax Code Section 171.109(a).93 The Tax Division argued that the
losses in these shells were unrealized, and could not be written off, because
the subsidiaries remained in existence, and the comptroller concluded that
the shells had some residual value. In addressing the taxpayer's argument
that the decline in value occurred as a result of a "specifically identifiable
event" 94 (the shells' disposition of all their assets), the comptroller relied on
an earlier decision 95 rejecting a similar argument.
These decisions reflect the comptroller's reluctance to allow taxpayers to
reduce their surplus by any items other than those specifically listed in Sec-
tion 171. 109.96 Nonetheless, taxpayers prevailed in some efforts to reduce
taxable surplus. In Decision 27,24297 for example, the comptroller ruled
that expected decommissioning costs of a nuclear generating plant should be
subtracted from surplus with respect to the taxpayer's 1986 and 1987 report
years. The Tax Division argued that the liability should not be subtracted
from surplus because the liability had not been booked by the taxpayer.
However, observing that the liability was footnoted in the taxpayer's finan-
cial statements, the comptroller treated these decommissioning costs simi-
larly to unfunded pension costs, which could be subtracted from surplus for
the report years at issue.98 This decision, although favorable to taxpayers,
appears inconsistent with the comptroller's more narrow definition of debt in
the other cited cases.
Other significant administrative decisions99 concluded that a corporation
90. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,758.
91. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,973 (July 30, 1992). The taxpayers in both this decision
and Comptroller Hearing No. 27,758 have filed refund suits in Travis County District Court.
92. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,866 (Apr. 30, 1992).
93. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(a) (Vernon 1992).
94. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,866.
95. Comptroller Hearing No. 20,448 (Dec. 31, 1987).
96. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109 (Vernon 1992) provides that surplus includes un-
realized, estimated, or contingent losses or obligations or any writedown of assets other than a
revenue or allowance for uncollectable accounts and a contra-asset account for depletion, de-
preciation or amortization. Id. § 171.109(a),(i).
97. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,242 (May 15, 1992).
98. See Comptroller Hearing Nos. 21,122 and 22,234 (Jan. 5, 1989). But see Comptroller
Hearing No. 28,399 (June 8, 1992) (retirement and post-retirement employee benefits not sub-
tracted from surplus for 1989 report year because the expected liabilities were based on actua-
rial estimates and were not certain).
99. The comptroller issued numerous decisions in addition to the ones discussed. Comp-
troller Hearing No. 28,206 (July 14, 1992), for example, addressed the definition of treasury
stock. The taxpayer owned approximately 15 percent of a corporation (X) that owned be-
tween 30 and 60 percent of the taxpayer's stock over the relevant period. Taxpayer's account-
1993] TAXA TION 1813
SMU LAW REVIEW
may not exclude from surplus the pre-acquisition earnings of second-tier
subsidiaries, 00 that tax effecting is required in recomputing taxpayer
franchise tax liability,10' and addressed push-down accounting. 10 2 As in
past Survey periods, significant issues are the subject of litigation, although
many cases will be resolved at the district court level without published
opinions.
C. CALCULATION AND ALLOCATION OF TAXABLE EARNED SURPLUS
As Texas adapts to having a tax that functions like an income tax, other
states' income tax interpretations become more relevant to Texas taxpayers
than in the past. Among the several Supreme Court cases during the Survey
period that discuss the parameters of a state's ability to tax are two that
focus on dividend income to be included in the tax base.
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation10 3 focuses on states'
rights to tax certain dividend income earned by a company that is subject to
the state's taxation. Bendix Corporation, the predecessor of Allied-Signal,
contested New Jersey's attempt to include in apportionable income for state
tax purposes the gain recognized on Bendix's sale of a minority interest in
ASARCO. Although Bendix and ASARCO were not unitary businesses,
New Jersey argued that Bendix's gain on the ASARCO sale should be in-
cluded in the tax base. Contrary to its normal practice, the Supreme Court
ordered the case set for re-argument subsequent to the original oral argu-
ment and requested supplemental briefs addressing the possible overruling of
ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission °0 and F W Woolworth Co.
v. Taxation and Revenue Department,0 5 both of which support the unitary
ants required it to report its X stock on financial statements as treasury stock. The Tax
Division argued that, for franchise tax purposes, the stock was not treasury stock because it
represented an investment in another corporation. However, the comptroller ruled that be-
cause surplus is computed in accordance with GAAP, and because GAAP treats such stock as
treasury stock, the stock should be treated as treasury stock. Id.
100. See Comptroller Hearing No. 27,492 (Jan. 3, 1992). See also Comptroller Hearing
Nos. 23,873 and 26,405 (Apr. 29, 1991). In distinguishing State v. Sun Refining & Mktg., Inc.,
740 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied), which held that the pre-acquisition
earnings of subsidiaries should not be included in the acquiring parent corporation's taxable
surplus, the comptroller concluded that the holding in Sun Refining should be limited to the
retained earnings of directly owned (first-tier) subsidiaries. Id. Comptroller Hearing Nos.
23,874, 23,874A and 26,474 held that Sun Refining applies only if an acquired subsidiary
existed at the close of the parent's fiscal year. Comptroller Hearing Nos. 23,874, 23,874A and
26,474 (Dec. 5, 1991). Texas courts may ultimately be required to address the limits of the
holding in Sun Refining.
101. See Comptroller Hearing Nos. 26,070, 26,346 and 26,347 (Sept. 30, 1991) (holding
that taxpayer's downward adjustments to its surplus made to reflect unbooked postretirement
benefit liabilities should be modified upwards to reflect federal income tax benefits associated
with such liabilities).
102. Comptroller Hearing No. 27,377, still in proposed form at the end of the Survey pe-
riod, held that the comptroller may not require a corporation to use push-down accounting on
the facts in that case (corporation not required by GAAP to use push-down accounting). The
rationale in this decision is based in part on a prior comptroller decision that focused on the
investment tax credit (Decision No. 25,545 (Dec. 6, 1990)).
103. 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992).
104. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
105. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
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principle of taxation. Following reargument, the Court held that New
Jersey could not include in apportionable income for state tax purposes the
gain Bendix received from the sale of a minority interest in an unrelated,
non-unitary business. 106
Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance,10 7
another Supreme Court case decided during the Survey period, further illus-
trates limitations imposed on states in determining which dividend income
to include in the tax base. The Court held that Iowa's tax scheme, which
included dividends received from non-United States corporations in the tax
base, but excluded dividends from domestic corporations, was facially dis-
criminatory against foreign commerce. 08
D. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Virtually every significant franchise tax rule was revised during 1992 as
the comptroller sought to offer further guidance - and some further restric-
tions - on determining franchise tax liability.l°9
Rule 3.572,110 which fueled numerous debates as to the comptroller's rule-
making authority, had become the subject of at least two court cases when
the comptroller decided to abandon the most controversial section of the
rule. Rule 3.572, first proposed in November 1991,111 was designed to deny
taxpayers the benefit of merging a target company out of existence prior to
the effective date of the franchise tax 112 and thereby allowing the target com-
pany to escape the newly enacted tax. The rule required the surviving cor-
poration to pay a supplemental tax based on the target's pre-merger
106. 112 S. Ct. at 2264.
107. 112 S. Ct. 2365 (1992).
108. 112 S. Ct. at 2372.
109. Several rules were adopted during the Survey period without changes from the ver-
sions proposed in December 1991: 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.541 (Exemptions); 3.542
(Trade Show); 3.543 (Deposit); 3.545 (Extensions); 3.546 (Taxable Capital: Nexus); 3.547
(Taxable Capital: Accounting Methods); 3.550 (Taxable Capital: Stated Capital); 3.552 (Tax-
able Capital: In Process of Liquidation); 3.553 (Taxable Capital: Oil & Gas Reserves); 3.554(Earned Surplus: Nexus) (A revised version of this rule was circulating in draft form, but had
not been adopted at the end of the Survey period.); 3.570 (Liens); 3.574 ($100 Prepayment)
(West Supp. 1992). These rules are effective as of March 16, 1992. See 17 Tex. Reg. 1652
(1992). Other franchise tax rules adopted during the Survey period include 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 3.544 (Reports and Payments) (eff. Oct. 21, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 7102); 3.548 (Taxable
Capital: Close and S Corporations) (eff. Sept. 29, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 6373); 3.551 (Taxable
Capital: Surplus) (eff. Nov. 11, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 7587); 3.555 (Earned Surplus: Computa-
tion) (eff. Sept. 23, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 6277); 3.556 (Earned Surplus: S Corporations) (eff.
Sept. 29, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 6373); 3.559 (Earned Surplus: Temporary Credit) (eff. May 26,
1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 3473); 3.561 (Enterprise Zones) (eff. Mar. 12, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 1652);
3.565 (Survivor of Mergers) (eff. July 29, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 5119); 3.566 (Title Insurance
Holding Companies (eff. May 4, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 2874); 3.568 (Changes in Corporate Or-
ganization) (eff. Nov. 12, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 7671).
110. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.572 (eff. Apr. 27, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 2606).
111. See 16 Tex. Reg. 6847 (1991) (prop. to be codified at TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.572 (17
Tex. Reg. 2606)) (Nov. 26, 1991 proposed version of the rule).
112. The franchise tax, in its current form, became effective Jan. 1, 1992. Act of Aug. 22,
1991, 72d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 5, § 8.27, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 134, 167 (Vernon).
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income.1 13 The comptroller's 1992 transition rule was essentially an effort to
do what the Legislature did not do - impose an additional tax on corpora-
tions that withdrew from Texas in 1991.114 Although the rule was substan-
tially revised prior to its, April 1992 adoption,1 15 the revised, better drafted
rule nonetheless exceeded the comptroller's authority.' 16
Subsection 3.572(b),1 17 which the comptroller has indicated will be de-
leted from Rule 3.572, attempted to adopt a "principal purpose of evasion or
avoidance of tax" test for determining which corporations would be required
to pay tax on income earned by a non-surviving corporation. 118 Because the
most controversial part of the rule will apparently be repealed, the rule's
importance is minimized. However, the rule's history - from proposal to
amendment - is an interesting study in rulemaking that may serve as a
guide for analyzing other rules. The comptroller's abandonment of this rule
apparently reflects a recognition that the rule exceeds his authority. Ques-
tions still remain as to whether 1993 will witness the withdrawal or substan-
tial revision of other rules that appear to exceed the comptroller's regulatory
authority.1 19 Faced with a myriad of taxpayer plans to escape the tax, the
113. § 3.572(a)(1) (proposed version, 16 Tex. Reg. 6847) (requiring surviving corporation
to pay a "supplemental tax.").
114. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0011 (Vernon 1992); TEX. TAX CODE ANN.§ 171.0011(a) imposes an "additional tax" on each corporation that was subject to the
franchise tax which is no longer subject to the "taxing jurisdiction of this state in relation to
the tax on net taxable earned surplus." 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.567 (effective July 29,
1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 5119), provides that the additional tax applies to corporations that, after
December 31, 1991, no longer have "sufficient nexus" with Texas to be subject to a tax based
on earned surplus. This new rule further provides that the corporation must file a final report
and pay the additional tax within 60 days after the corporation ceases to have sufficient nexus
with Texas. Id. § 3.567(b). The comptroller requires estimated payments of the additional tax
before a corporation can receive clearance to dissolve, merge or withdraw. Id.
115. Cf the proposed rule (16 Tex. Reg. 6847, proposed November 26, 1991) (proposing a
"supplemental tax") with the adopted rule at 17 Tex. Reg. 2606 (eff. Apr. 27, 1992) (adopting
the "principal purpose" test).
116. Administrative rules may not expand the scope of the state's authority to impose
taxes. See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bullock, 573 S.W.2d 497, 500 n.3 (Tex. 1978).
117. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.572(b) provides:
A corporation.., which is the surviving corporation in any merger, reorganiza-
tion or transfer of assets occurring after August 13, 1991, and on or before De-
cember 31, 1991, will be subject to tax on the net taxable earned surplus of the
nonsurviving corporation which is earned from the day after the date upon
which the nonsurviving corporation's previous franchise tax report was based
through the date of the merger, reorganization, or transfer of assets from the
nonsurviving corporation to the surviving corporation if the principal purpose of
the merger, reorganization, or transfer of assets was the evasion or avoidance of
franchise tax.
118. The rule also set forth a multi-step procedure allowing taxpayers to file a disclosure
statement, get a preliminary determination from the comptroller, and submit additional infor-
mation to the comptroller. Id. § 3.572(b). In fact, prior to announcing that § (b) of the rule
would be deleted, the comptroller informed many taxpayers who had complied with this pro-
cedure that their 1991 year-end mergers would be respected, so that no additional tax would be
due.
119. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558(g)(2) (eff. Sept. 29, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 6373)
(addressing exemption for S corporations from compensation add-back). The comptroller is
concerned that since the compensation add-back required by TEX. TAX CODE § 171.110(a)
(Vernon 1992) for earned surplus purposes does not apply to S corporations (see id.
§ 171.110(b)(1)), S corporations could inflate officer/director compensation figures, thereby
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comptroller has sought to stem the tide of tax-planning revenue losses by
promulgating regulations that purport to adopt substance-over-form and
tax-avoidance concepts that are more characteristic of federal tax law than
of Texas tax law.
Accordingly, substantial controversy exists with respect to the extent to
which the revised franchise tax statute adopted the Internal Revenue Code.
On the one hand, the Texas tax is explicitly based to some extent on federal
law. 120 On the other hand, many sections of the revised Texas Tax Code are
patently inconsistent with federal principles.1 2'
Rule 3.558 illustrates the layering of federal tax principles onto state tax
concepts. 122 In arriving at taxable earned surplus from franchise tax pur-
poses, a corporation is required by statute to add to its reportable federal
taxable income (subject to some exceptions) "any compensation of officers or
directors, or if a bank, any compensation of directors and executive officers,
to the extent excluded in determining federal taxable income .... ,,123 To
prevent taxpayers from characterizing creatively, but perhaps inaccurately,
compensation too narrowly, a draft version of Rule 3.558 broadly defined
compensation as "[a]ll remuneration by whatever name whether in cash or
any other medium for services performed by an employee... including re-
muneration on behalf of or for the benefit of the employee."' 24
The rule as adopted defines compensation by reference to the amount re-
portable to an officer or director for the tax reporting period as includable in
the officer's/director's federal taxable income, without regard to any mone-
excluding that compensation from the earned surplus subject to tax. Rule 3.558 therefore
provides for a reallocation of officer/director compensation if such compensation is considered
excessive. The rule includes a non-exclusive list of eight factors to be used in evaluating
whether compensation is excessive. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558(g)(2). Section 3.558(h)
provides, consistent with statutory authority, that a subsidiary cannot qualify for the 35 or
fewer shareholder exclusion if it has a parent which does not qualify for the exclusion. The
rule further provides that a parent is defined as any corporation (or limited liability company)
that ultimately controls the subsidiary even though control is indirect. Id. § 3.558(h).
120. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110 (Vernon 1992) (earned surplus computa-
tion based on reportable federal taxable income).
121. See, e.g., id. § 171.110(d) (determining taxable earned surplus of S corporations).
122. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558 (eff. Sept. 29, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 6373).
123. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(a)(1) (Vernon 1992). 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.558(b)(4) provides that officers and directors of non-banking corporations are determined
in accordance with the corporation's bylaws and the laws of the corporation's state of incorpo-
ration. Identifying executive officers and directors of banks is much more complex. In deter-
mining who is an executive officer, the rule generally disregards official titles and looks to who
has authority to participate in major policy-making functions of the bank. Id. § 3.558(b)(5).
The rule, however, appears to create some presumptions. The chairman of the board, the
president, every vice president, the cashier, the secretary, and the treasurer of a bank are
treated as executive officers unless the officer is excluded from participation by resolution of
the board or by the bank's bylaws. Thus, each bank subject to the tax should carefully review
its bylaws and relevant resolutions to determine whether an express exclusion of participatory
authority of certain officers would be beneficial. The term executive officer does not include a
manager or assistant manager of a branch of a bank unless that individual participates in major
policy-making functions. The officers and directors of limited liability companies are manag-
ers or management persons identified in the company's articles, operating agreement or similar
agreements required under the laws of the company's state of organization. Id. § 3.558(b)(6).
124. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558(b)(3) as circulated in draft form, prior to promulga-
tion of the rule in its proposed form.
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tary limitations imposed for federal tax purposes. 125 The rule treats all com-
pensation of an officer or director, including compensation as an employee of
the corporation, as compensation of an officer or director. 126 Typical of the
comptroller's increasing attempts to make substance-over-form arguments,
Rule 3.558(0 provides that in certain circumstances payments for corporate
services will be treated as compensation paid to officers or directors 1 27
Many taxpayers have attempted to restructure their businesses to reduce
the number of shareholders because corporations with fewer than thirty-six
shareholders (and limited liability companies with fewer than thirty-six
members) are not subject to the compensation addback.128 Comptroller rep-
resentatives confirmed orally in 1991 that a partnership would constitute a
single shareholder. 29 However, faced with the possibility of numerous tax-
motivated partnerships, the comptroller has taken the position that if a trust,
partnership, or other investor-entity "is organized or maintained primarily
to avoid the add-back of compensation under the Tax Code," each share-
holder or owner of the entity will count as a shareholder. 130 Neither the
attempt to look through partnerships nor the plan to disregard excessive
officer compensation is rooted in statutory authority, and both are likely to
be challenged. Although the legislature enacted a specific look-through pro-
vision with respect to corporations, 13 there is no comparable look-through
provision for partnerships. The compensation limit is also likely to face
challenge, as is the requirement that capitalized compensation be added
back. 132
The comptroller has also adopted new rules on apportionment of taxable
capital and earned surplus. These rules illustrate both the similarities and
the divergence between taxable capital calculations (which are based on gen-
erally accepted accounting principles) 133 and earned surplus calculations
(which are based on federal income tax principles). 134 Both the taxable capi-
tal rule 135 and the earned surplus rule 136 define revenue in terms of "the
value of inflows of economic resources from separate legal entities for deliv-
ering or producing goods, rendering services, or carrying out other activities
.. " and have similar rules with respect to several items 137 but provide dif-
125. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558(a)(3) (eff. Sept. 29, 1992).
126. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558(d).
127. Id. § 3.558(0. (The example provided in the rule relates to service fees, paid to related
corporations, that may be treated as compensation paid to the corporation's own officers.)
128. Id. § 3.558(g)(1). See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(b) (Vernon 1992).
129. In addition, the comptroller issued written letters confirming this result.
130. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558(b)(7).
131. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(c), which effectively treats a corporation as hav-
ing more than 35 shareholders if the corporation's parent corporation has more than 35
shareholders.
132. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.358(e).
133. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.112(a) (Vernon 1992).
134. See, e.g., id. § 171.1121(a).
135. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(b)(6) (eff. Nov. 13, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 7663).
136. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(b)(7) (eff. Nov. 13, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 7667).
137. Cf id. § 3.549(e)(1) with § 3.557(e)(1) (reimbursements to a corporate agent are not
gross receipts if the reimbursements do not exceed actual expenses paid to a third party).
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ferent rules regarding other items, including partnership income. 38
These lengthy rules include guidance not only with respect to frequently-
occurring items such as dividends and sales receipts, 139 but also regarding
items such as debt forgiveness,' 40 exchanges of property, 141 and litigation
awards 42 that occur far less frequently. The rules also address the "throw-
back rule," under which receipts for certain non-Texas transactions are
treated as Texas receipts if the taxpayer is not "subject to taxation" in the
non-Texas state. 14 3
In contrast to its proposed form, 144 the earned surplus apportionment rule
as adopted provides that having a certificate of authority in another state is
not sufficient to cause a corporation to be considered subject to taxation for
throwback rule purposes except for reports originally due prior to January 1,
1993.145 If, as the proposed rule provided, a corporation were treated as
subject to tax for earned surplus purposes in any state in which it holds a
certificate of authority, taxpayers might have been able to acquire certificates
of authority in several other states to avoid having receipts from those states
thrown back to Texas under the throwback rule.
Although substantial portions of the new and revised rules represent well-
established comptroller policy and straightforward statutory interpretation,
the rules also include many questionable provisions that are likely to be chal-
lenged in administrative and court proceedings. 146
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered two important property tax
decisions during the Survey period. In Smith v. Travis County Education
District,147 the Fifth Circuit addressed whether federal courts have jurisdic-
138. Cf. id. § 3.549(e)(29) (receipts reflecting net partnership profits are apportioned to the
partnership's principal place of business, as defined in the rule; the corporation's share of gross
profits may be used if allowed as revenue under GAAP, and apportioned as if the receipts were
earned directly by the corporation) with § 3.557(e)(24) (corporation's share of gross receipts
from partnership included in federal taxable income must be included in gross receipts and
must be apportioned as though the corporation directly earned such receipts; no alternate
method provided).
139. See id. §§ 3.549(e)(3) and (41); 3.557(e)(13) and (37).
140. See id. §§ 3.549(e)(9); 3.557(e)(8).
141. See id. §§ 3.549(e)(15); 3.557(e)(14).
142. See id. §§ 3.549(e)(26); 3.557(e)(21).
143. See id. §§ 3.549(e)(41)(I); 3.557(e)(37)(I).
144. See 17 Tex. Reg. 4332 (proposed version).
145. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557.
146. See, e.g., 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.555(e) which attempts to adopt I.R.C. § 482 by
providing:
If the comptroller determines that transactions between members of a controlled
group of corporations are not entered into on an arm's-length basis, the comp-
troller may distribute or allocate income and deductions as necessary to prevent
franchise tax avoidance provided such adjustments are authorized by applying
principles in Internal Revenue Code § 482, and regulations thereunder.
§ 3.557(d)(9) includes a similar provision with respect to the apportionment of earned surplus.
147. 968 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1992).
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tion to hear a taxpayer's challenge to Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independ-
ent School District v. Edgewood Independent School District148 (commonly
referred to as Edgewood 111). In Edgewood III, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the Texas public school finance system violated the Texas Consti-
tution, but chose to defer the effect of its ruling for seventeen months to
avoid disruption of public school operations and to enable the Texas legisla-
ture to consider all options fully.' 49 The taxpayer sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the imposition and collection of 1991 and 1992 county education
district taxes violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution,' 50 and sought an injunction prohibiting
collection of the 1992 taxes and requiring the State of Texas to fashion an
appropriate remedy to the unconstitutional collection of the 1991 taxes al-
ready paid.' 5 ' The Fifth Circuit in Smith rejected the taxpayer's plea for a
declaratory judgment and injunction, and remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to dismiss the suit.15 2 In dismissing the lawsuit, the
Fifth Circuit relied on the Tax Injunction Act,' 5 3 which prohibits federal
courts from interfering with state taxation matters where state law provides
a plain, speedy and efficient remedy.154 The court ruled that because there
was no indication that Texas courts had refused to entertain the taxpayer's
federal claim, the Tax Injunction Act barred the federal courts from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over this matter. 155
In Irving Independent School District v. Packard Properties,'56 the Fifth
Circuit held that pre-existing liens for unpaid property taxes were not extin-
guished when the relevant properties were acquired by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), acting as a receiver for a savings and loan
association. 5 7 The FDIC asserted that 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(3) 158 requires
pre-existing liens, to the extent they support penalties, to be extinguished
once the FDIC obtains ownership of the property. In rejecting the FDIC's
148. 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992). See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, 1992 Survey, at 2113-14 for a
summary of Edgewood III.
149. Carrollton-Farmers Branch LS.D., 826 S.W.2d at 522, 524.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
151. Smith, 968 F.2d at 454-55.
152. Id. at 456.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
154. Smith, 968 F.2d at 456.
155. Id. The court's conclusion that the taxpayer has a plain, speedy and efficient remedy
in state court is interesting given that Edgewood III expressly provides that the "ruling is not
to be used as a defense to the payment of any such taxes." Carrollton-Farmers Branch IS.D.,
826 S.W.2d at 522. In fact, Justice Doggett in his dissent (joined by Justice Mauzy) in
Edgewood III wrote that he expected intrusion by federal courts as a result of the "prospec-
tive-plus" application of the holding in Edgewood III, and hinted that a taxpayer might be able
to secure an injunction against the application of the court's ruling in Edgewood III because of
the failure of the state to provide a clear and certain remedy when a state tax is collected
illegally. Id. at 569 (Doggett, J., dissenting); see also McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1900).
156. 970 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1992).
157. Id. at 62. See Ohlenforst & Dorrill, 1992 Survey at 2115, and 1991 Survey at 664, for
discussions of the lower court holdings.
158. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(3) (Supp. III 1992).
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arguments, the court ruled that while Section 1825(b)(2) 159 prevents liens
from attaching to property while the FDIC owns it, a property encumbered
by a lien at the time the FDIC acquires the property remains in effect.16°
The court recognized that the FDIC was not liable for penalties under Sec-
tion 1825(b)(3), but allowed the liens to remain in place because Congress
chose to leave property acquired by the FDIC in the condition the FDIC
found it.
16 1
The court also held that the FDIC was exempt from interest on delin-
quent taxes (under Section 33.01(c) of the Tax Code162) and penalties for
non-payment of property tax (under Section 33.07 of the Tax Code' 63) be-
cause federal law exempts the FDIC from payment of such amounts.1
64
While the court recognized that Section 33.01(c) provides that the interest
charges on delinquent taxes are designed to compensate taxing units for lost
revenue, the court reasoned that the language in Section 33.01(c) providing
that the interest "is to compensate the taxing unit for revenue lost because of
the delinquency" did not become law until 1991, long after these interest
charges were imposed on the taxpayer. 65 Prior to this amendment, Texas
law clearly regarded this interest charge as a penalty.166 Section 33.07 pro-
vides that property taxes delinquent on July 1 incur an additional penalty to
defray costs of collection. 167 The court ruled that Section 33.07 functions as
a penalty statute because it refers specifically to collection costs as
penalties. 16 8
In Tarrant Appraisal District v. American Airlines, Inc., 169 the Fort Worth
court of appeals held that a taxpayer's leasehold interest in property for ad
valorem tax purposes must be valued by using the equity method, which
bases the value of a leasehold interest on the lessee's equity or profit in the
lease.' 70 Under the equity method, a leasehold interest will have no value
159. 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) (Supp. III 1992).
160. Irving /S.D., 970 F.2d at 61.
161. Id. at 62. The effect of this holding is that, while the taxing units cannot foreclose
their liens (with respect to penalties) while the FDIC owns the property, once the FDIC sells
the property, the lien may be foreclosed. See id. at 62. Thus, the FDIC is effectively burdened
by the lien because it will likely receive less sales proceeds on the property given that the buyer
will be burdened by the lien. Id.
162. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.01(c) (Vernon 1992), amended by Act of 1991, 72d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 836, § 5.3, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2893 (Vernon).
163. Id. § 33.07.
164. Irving .S.D., 970 F.2d at 65-66.
165. Id. at 65. Thus, the court implies that because § 33.01(c) interest charges are now
expressly designed to compensate for lost revenue due to collection efforts, rather than being in
the nature of a penalty, such charges could be imposed on the FDIC.
166. Id. at 65. See Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 45 S.W.2d 130 (1931); Spindletop Oil
and Gas Co. v. Parker County, 738 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ denied).
167. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.07(a) (Vernon 1992). The penalty is imposed only if a
taxing unit or appraisal district elects to impose the penalty. Id. The penalty may not exceed
15 percent of the aggregate taxes, penalties and interest due. Id.
168. Irving I.S.D., 970 F.2d at 66. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejects the holding
of the Bankruptcy Court in In re Soraiz, No. 88-01741 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989), an unpub-
lished opinion, in which the court held that the Section 33.07 penalty was not punitive, but was
imposed to recover pecuniary losses. Irving I.S.D., 970 F.2d at 66.
169. 826 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
170. Id. at 771.
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(or negative value) under circumstances in which the rent is equal to or in
excess of the property's fair market rent for the years in question.'71 While
leasehold interests are generally not taxable under the Tax Code, a leasehold
interest in real property owned by an exempt owner is taxable, subject to
certain exceptions.172 Section 23.13 of the Texas Tax Code provides that a
leasehold or possessory interest in real property that is exempt from taxation
to the owner is appraised at the greater of (1) the total rent paid for the
interest for the current tax year, or (2) the market value of the leasehold or
other possessory interest. 173 The taxing unit asserted that the possessory
interest method should be used to value a leasehold interest for purposes of
Section 23.13. The possessory interest method values a leasehold by capital-
izing the rent due for the remainder of the lease, and generally results in a
much higher value than would be determined under the equity method. 174
Based largely on the fact that the statute prevents lessees from escaping
taxation if the leasehold has a negative or zero value, the court concluded
that it would be illogical to use the possessory interest method because under
such method it would be mathematically impossible for the amount to be
less than the contract rent for the year.'75
In a case of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court in Gifford-Hill &
Co. v. Wise County Appraisal District 76 held that, for property tax purposes,
limestone is not a mineral and may not be appraised separately from the
surface estate unless the limestone is part of a quarry. 177 In this case, the
taxpayer's land qualified for special appraisal as open-space land (which is
appraised based on its productive capacity); 178 however, the taxing unit at-
tempted to tax separately the limestone based on its fair market value by
categorizing it as "rock in place" rather than part of the surface estate. The
court first analyzed the types of real property that are taxable, and examined
Section 1.04 of the Tax Code which defines real property as, among other
things, land, a mine or quarry, or a mineral in place. 179 Although there is no
definition of the term "mineral" in the Tax Code, the court looked to the
ordinary and natural meaning of the term and concluded that it does not
include a substance such as limestone.' 80 In addressing whether the limes-
tone was taxable as a quarry, the court ruled that while limestone may be
part of a quarry for tax purposes, the fact that there was a quarry on the
171. Id. at 768, 770.
172. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.07 (Vernon 1992).
173. Id. § 23.13.
174. American Airlines, 826 S.W.2d at 768, 771.
175. Id. at 770-71. In addition, the court concluded that use of the possessory interest
method would effectively result in the lessee's being taxed on the lessor's property value. Id. at
771.
176. 827 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1991).
177. Id. at 815.
178. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 23.51, 23.52 (Vernon 1992).
179. Id. § 1.04.
180. Gifford-Hill, 827 S.W.2d at 815. The court recognized that the scientific or technical
definition of "minerals" is broad enough to include limestone. However, since the scientific
definition would also include the soil itself, the court believed that the ordinary meaning of the
term is a more appropriate source for property tax purposes. Id.
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taxpayer's tract does not automatically subject the entire tract to ad valorem
taxation as a quarry.181 For example, while the term "quarry" includes the
open excavation site, the limestone being quarried and surface land upon
which any quarrying operation is being conducted, it does not include adja-
cent land in the path of the quarry and its limestone deposit.18 2
In Exxon Corp. v. San Patricio County Appraisal District, 83 the Corpus
Christi court of appeals held that oil located in working oil tanks on January
1 was subject to tax in the county in which the tanks were located even
though no individual barrel of oil remained in the county for more than
seventeen days.' 8 4 Exxon maintained at least 400,000 barrels of oil and sev-
enteen tanks in the county at all times. On January 1, 1988, almost 800,000
barrels of crude oil were located in these tanks, and San Patricio County
sought to tax the oil located in such tanks. Exxon asserted that the proper
tax situs of the barrels of oil was not in San Patricio County because each
barrel transported through the county remained there only temporarily.
Rather, Exxon believed that, under Section 21.02(4) of the Tax Code, 18 5 the
oil should be taxed in the county in which it maintains its principal place of
business. In rejecting Exxon's position, the court reasoned that the fact that
each individual barrel remains in the county for less than seventeen days is
inconsequential given that Exxon continually maintained a massive quantity
of oil in the county.' 86 In essence, the court analyzed the oil as fungible
property. The court also stated that the theory of "mobilia sequuntur per-
sonam" (i.e., that movable property follows the person) has gradually dissi-
pated over time.'8 7 The court maintained that the doctrine of mobilia is
being replaced by the acquired situs rule, which provides that property can
acquire its own tax situs in an area if it has a "degree of permanency" with
such area which will distinguish it from property in the area on a purely
temporary or transitory basis.188 In ruling that the oil had acquired situs in
San Patricio County, the court looked to the benefits and protections pro-
vided by the county to Exxon's personal property, and found that the oil had
significant contact with the county because the county rendered substantial
181. Id. at 816.
182. Id. Two other opinions issued during the Survey period that address open-space land
are noteworthy. In Moore v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist., 823 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1992), rev'd, 845 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1993) the Fort Worth court of appeals decided
whether property used for recreational purposes may qualify as open-space land. The court
held in McCormick v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 822 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1992, no writ), that the statutory requirement that land cannot qualify as open-space land
unless it is principally devoted to agricultural uses for five of the preceding seven years is not
an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
183. 822 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
184. Id. at 271, 276.
185. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.02(4) (Vernon 1992). The taxing unit argued that be-
cause the oil was located in the unit on January 1 for more than a temporary period, it was
taxed in the unit under Section 21.02(1) of the Tax Code. Id. § 21.02(1).
186. Exxon Corp., 822 S.W.2d at 272-73.




services with respect to such property. 18 9
The Tyler court of appeals in Texas Department of Corrections v. Anderson
County Appraisal District'90 applied a "substance-over-form" approach to
determine the taxable owner of a prison built by the Texas Department of
Corrections (TDC). In order to take advantage of certain tax-exempt financ-
ing benefits without violating the Texas Constitution's prohibition against
the state's creating certain debt, the TDC transferred legal title to prison
land to a trust, and leased back the property. The lease provided that legal
title to the property would be transferred back to the TDC upon satisfaction
of all lease payments. The TDC argued that, because it was the equitable
owner of the property, the property was not subject to tax; thus, the property
was exempt because it was used for public purposes. The court ruled that
the burden of property taxation is placed on the equitable owner of the prop-
erty rather than the property's legal owner, and that the evidence clearly
indicated that the TDC was the equitable owner of the property.191
In First Baptist Church v. Bexar County Appraisal Review Board,192 the
Texas Supreme Court upheld a jury's finding that a church parking lot was
used primarily for religious purposes, and was therefore exempt from prop-
erty tax, in spite of the fact that the church leased the lot to a private com-
pany five days a week during working hours. 193 The church owned two
parking lots which it leased to a private entity. The lease permitted the pri-
vate entity to use almost all the spaces during weekday working hours, but
reserved use of the parking lot for the church at all other times. The church
sought an exemption from property tax on the parking lot under Section
11.20 of the Tax Code, which provides that a religious organization is enti-
tled to a property tax exemption on its real property that is used primarily as
a place of religious worship and is reasonably necessary for engaging in reli-
gious worship.194 A parking lot can qualify as a place of religious worship
189. Id. at 275. The court also ruled that the taxpayer's prior rendering of the property in
the county is admissible with respect to the issue of tax situs because it enlightens the trial
court on the taxpayer's state of mind and its interpretation of the property's status. Id. at 274.
In another case during the Survey period addressing taxation of items that are moved fre-
quently, the Houston (1st Dist.) court of appeals in Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Trans-
america Container Leasing Inc., 821 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991),
cert. granted and judgment vacated, 61 U.S.L.W. 3446, 3612, 3619 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1993) held
that it was not constitutionally permissible for the Harris Appraisal District to tax shipping
containers that were frequently present within the district, but which were used exclusively in
foreign commerce, because the district did not present any evidence that the tax would not
create an enhanced risk that the containers would be subjected to multiple international
taxation.
190. 834 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
191. Id. at 131. See Texas Turnpike Co. v. Dallas County, 153 Tex. 474, 271 S.W.2d 400,
402 (1954). A taxing unit may attempt to use the court's rationale in Texas Dept. of Correc-
tions to its advantage in a circumstance in which more tax revenue could be generated were the
lessee treated as the taxable owner of a property. For example, if an exempt entity leased
property to a private entity pursuant to a lease with a bargain purchase option, a taxing unit
would likely raise more revenue were it successful in asserting that the private lessee is the
equitable owner of the leased property.
192. 833 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1992).
193. Id. at 111.
194. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(a)(l) (Vernon 1992).
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because the definition includes grounds surrounding the sanctuary which are
necessary to the use of the church. 9 5 The court ruled that the jury's finding
that the parking lots were used primarily for religious purposes should be
upheld in spite of mathematical calculations demonstrating that the private
entity physically occupied the parking lots more than the church did. 196
The court reasoned that while the actual use of properties is an important
factor in determining primary use, it is not the sole consideration, and that
because several witnesses testified that the church's primary use of the park-
ing lot is to provide church members with access to church facilities, there
was probative evidence to support the jury's conclusions. 197
The San Antonio court of appeals in Atascosa County Appraisal Dist. v.
Tymrak19 8 held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in award-
ing attorney's fees under Section 42.29 of the Tax Code' 99 to a taxpayer who
settled with the appraisal district a property tax valuation issue for a lower
amount than the appraisal district's original valuation.200 The appraisal dis-
trict argued that because the case was settled, there was no evidence that the
taxpayer had prevailed in the case. The court disagreed, reasoning that
while Section 42.29 requires an appeal in order for attorney's fees to be
awarded, it does not require a trial.20 The court also ruled that the lower
court had not abused its discretion in granting the taxpayer $20,000 in attor-
neys fees ($5,000 per tax year). 20 2 Section 42.29, as in effect for the years at
issue, limited the award of attorney's fees to the greater of twenty percent of
the taxes in controversy or $5,000 per appeal. 20 3 The appraisal district ar-
gued that because only one lawsuit was involved, only $5,000 of attorneys
fees should have been allowed. The court, however, upheld the lower court's
ruling that each tax year constitutes a separate appeal under Section
42.29.20
4
195. Austin v. University Christian Church, 768 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. 1988) (addressing
whether church parking lots leased to a private entity were exempt).
196. First Baptist, 833 S.W.2d at 111.
197. Id.
198. 815 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), afid, No. D-1804, 1993 WL 30594
(Tex. Feb. 10, 1993).
199. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.29 (Vernon 1992).
200. Atascosa County App. Dist., 833 S.W.2d at 366.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 369.
203. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.29 (Vernon 1992), amended by Act of 1991, 72d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 836, § 4.1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2893 (1991). Section 42.29 now limits attor-
ney's fees to the greater of $15,000 or 20 percent of the total amount by which the property
owner's tax liability is reduced as a result of the appeal (but not to exceed the aggregate
amount the owner's tax liability is reduced). TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.29 (Vernon 1992).
204. Atascosa County Appraisal Dist., 833 S.W.2d at 369. Gano v. City of Houston, 834
S.W.2d 585 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied), another case during the
Survey period addressing attorney's fees, stands for the proposition that a taxpayer may avoid
being required to pay attorney's fees if it pays all taxes, penalties, interest and court costs prior
to trial, because no amounts would be adjudged due. In Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Seven
Inv. Co., 835 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tex. 1992), the Texas Supreme Court held that attorney's fees
under § 42.29 are not recoverable in an appeal involving the denial of an open-space land





In City of Houston v. First City20 5 a Houston court of appeals addressed
several procedural issues with respect to collection penalties and attorneys
fees. In this case, the taxing unit sued the property owner and the lienholder
to recover delinquent taxes, interest and penalties due thereon, and attor-
neys fees. In response to the lawsuit, the lender, which was proceeding with
foreclosure, remitted checks to the taxing authorities in payment of all out-
standing taxes, interest and penalties for the years at issue. The letter trans-
mitting these checks, however, provided that payment was to be applied only
to tax, interest and penalties pursuant to Section 33.01(a) of the Tax Code2°6
(penalty for delinquency) and was not to be applied to any penalties, costs or
fees pursuant to Section 33.07207 (penalty to defray collection costs) and/or
Section 33.48208 (recovery of collection costs, such as attorney's fees). The
taxing unit deposited the check and disregarded the notations on the check
by applying part of the payment to collection penalties and collection costs.
The court ruled that the taxing unit's acceptance of the check resulted in
the acceptance of the conditions associated with the check, namely to apply
the payment in full satisfaction of all amounts due except the disputed penal-
ties and fees under Sections 33.07 and 33.48.209 The court further ruled that
the taxing unit was not entitled to penalties under Section 33.07 because it
did not take official action to adopt the penalties or to notify the owner of the
property of the penalties. 210 In addition, the court held that the taxing unit
was not entitled to recover an award of attorney's fees without demonstrat-
ing that the fees are reasonable. 211 The court reasoned that the authoriza-
tion in Section 33.48 of attorney's fees up to fifteen percent of total taxes,
penalties and interest imposed on a taxpayer does not mean that a fifteen
percent fee is necessarily reasonable in a particular case. 212
In Harris County Appraisal Review Board v. General Electric Corp. 213 a
Houston court of appeals addressed whether a taxpayer is required to file a
second protest because of the appraisal review board's failure to schedule a
hearing on its original protest. General Electric had filed a timely protest
with the appraisal review board. Months after the due date of such taxes,
205. 827 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
206. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.01(a) (Vernon 1992).
207. Id. § 33.07.
208. Id. § 33.48.
209. City of Houston, 827 S.W.2d at 473.
210. Id. at 474. The penalty under § 33.07 cannot be automatically charged by a taxing
authority. Rather, it must elect to impose the penalty. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.07(a)
(Vernon 1992). In Salvaggio v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 752 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied), the Houston (14th Dist.) court of appeals held
that three separate actions must be taken before a penalty under § 33.07 can be imposed,
including delivering notice of the delinquency and the penalty to the taxpayer.
211. City of Houston, 827 S.W.2d at 476.
212. Id. The court also held that the trial court's decision not to hold the taxing unit's
counsel liable for the taxpayer's attorney's fees was not in error, reasoning that the decision to
disregard the taxpayer's instructions on its check was ultimately made by the taxing unit, not
its legal counsel. Id. at 479.
213. 819 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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General Electric reminded the appraisal district of the protest and of the fact
that no hearing had ever been scheduled. The appraisal district advised
General Electric that its sole remedy under such a circumstance was to file a
protest under Section 41.411 of the Tax Code2 14 regarding the appraisal re-
view board's failure to give notice of a hearing. The letter further provided
that because no protest was filed prior to the date the taxes became delin-
quent, the appraisal review board was without jurisdiction to rule on the
taxpayer's protest. The court sided with the taxpayer, holding that a tax-
payer who timely files a protest and pays the relevant taxes before the delin-
quency date should not have to file a second protest regarding the appraisal
review board's failure to schedule a hearing on the original protest. 2 15
During the Survey period, the comptroller adopted numerous property
tax rules as part of taking over the responsibilities of the State Property Tax
Board. 2 16 Because the Texas Legislature abolished in 1991 the State Prop-
erty Tax Board and transferred its duties to the comptroller,2 17 the comp-
troller was required to establish its own set of property tax rules, which are
generally similar to the State Property Tax Board's rules. The comptroller
also adopted rules concerning its responsibilities for conducting property
value studies and protest hearings concerning such studies. 218
IV. OTHER NEW DEVELOPMENTS: SUCCESSOR LIABILITY,
PERSONAL LIABILITY AND NEW PROCEDURES
Texas has continued to assert aggressively that individuals may be held
liable under Tax Code Section 171.255 for taxes in circumstances in which
the corporate charter is forfeited for failure to pay taxes. 219 In Wilburn v.
Texas,220 the Austin court of appeals held that liability for unpaid Texas
employment taxes is a debt for purposes of Section 171.255.221 In addition,
two recent court cases imposed personal liability upon officers of corpora-
tions for actions taken after they failed to pay their franchise taxes but before
their corporate charter was actually forfeited. 222 In other cases, individuals
214. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.411 (Vernon 1992).
215. Harris County, 819 S.W.2d at 918. The court reasoned that to the extent Section
41.411 requires a taxpayer to file another protest, it imposes an undue limitation on the tax-
payer's abilities to seek a judicial remedy. Id. at 919.
216. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 9.401-9.405, 9.801, 9.802, 9.1001 (eff. July 17, 1992, 17
Tex. Reg. 4806-08).
217. Act of June 16, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 843, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2905
(Vernon); Act of Aug. 29, 1991, 72d Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 6, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 26-41
(Vernon).
218. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 9.7-9.14 (eft. May 8, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 3002).
219. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255 (Vernon 1992). See also Dixon v. Texas, 808
S.W.2d 721, 724 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (corporate officials liable for
taxes in circumstances in which the corporation collected but failed to pay taxes over to the
state. Corporation officer held liable for taxes of a corporation even though the corporation
has not lost its charter).
220. 824 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
221. Id. at 762.
222. Dae Won Choe v. Chancellor, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no
writ) (personal liability imposed for debt incurred before forfeiture of corporation's corporate
charter but after the date of franchise tax, report or penalty was due but not filed or paid). See
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were held liable for federal unemployment taxes,223 and a Texas corporation
that failed to pay its franchise taxes was not permitted to bring a petition in
the Tax Court.224
Successor liability also continues to pose significant risks to Texas taxpay-
ers. Pursuant to Section 111.020 of the Texas Tax Code, 225 a buyer of a
business may be liable for franchise and sales taxes (and any other taxes
under Title 2 of the Tax Code) 226 owed by the seller, up to the purchase
price of the business or stock of goods. The comptroller has adopted Rule
3.7 which provides that a person who "sells the business or stock of goods of
a business or quits the business" for purposes of this successor liability stat-
ute may include a person who sells the capital assets of a business, or sells
the inventory of the business, or sells the name and goodwill of the busi-
ness. 227 In addition to setting forth procedures by which a buyer may obtain
assurance from the comptroller that the seller has no outstanding tax liabil-
ity, the rule lists factors that the comptroller must use in determining
whether a sale of business or stock of goods occurs. Generally, the sale of a
business is broadly defined as the sale of (1) a building, land, furniture, fix-
tures, inventory, and the right to use the seller's trade name; (2) all a busi-
ness's capital assets; (3) a business's name and goodwill; (4) all a business's
inventory; or (5) fixed assets and realty necessary to operate a similar busi-
ness as the seller at the same location. 228 The rule also provides that the sale
also Schindler v. Austwell Farmers Co-Op, 829 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1992), affid and modified, 841 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1992) (officer held liable for purchases made
during a period during which his wholly-owned corporation had lost its charter).
223. Mason v. U.S., 801 F. Supp. 718, 724 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding shareholders and
directors of a Texas corporation liable for unpaid federal employment taxes; the Internal Reve-
nue Service prevailed under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.225, which imposes liability for
"debts" rather than under Internal Revenue Code § 6672, which requires that individuals be
"responsible persons" to be held liable for unpaid federal employment taxes.)
224. Valhco Corp. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 428 (1992).
225. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.020 (Vernon 1992). Several recent administrative hear-
ings focused on successor liability under this section. Comptroller Hearing No. 28,712 (June
8, 1992) includes a good, brief discussion of the predecessors to this statute and notes that the
statute apparently tracks a California statute. See also Comptroller Hearing No. 28,813 (May
21, 1992) (stating comptroller view that successor has no standing to challenge the validity of
the underlying assessment); Comptroller Hearing No. 24,533 (Jan. 6, 1992) (finding that peti-
tioner may be the successor, but that a lack of consideration flowing to the seller for the acqui-
sition of the business means there is no basis for assessment of successor liability, and further
holding that neither Section 111.016, trust fund liability, nor Tax Division's efforts to trace the
seller's assets to petitioner allow a creditor to use a trust fund theory to attach such assets,
citing Henry I. Siegal Co., Inc. v. Holliday, 663 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1984), Hunter v. Fort Worth
Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981), and Texas Business Corporation Act art.6.04(A)(3)
and 7.12(A)(3)).
226. Id. Title 2 of the Tax Code contains, among other taxes, the limited sales, excise and
use tax, the motor vehicle sales and use tax, various motor fuel taxes, the cigarette tax, the
hotel occupancy tax, the interstate motor carrier sales and use tax, a tax on sales and use of
boats and boat motors, the franchise tax, various miscellaneous gross receipts taxes, miscella-
neous occupation taxes, the gas production tax, the oil production tax and inheritance taxes.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. Title 2 (Vernon 1992).
227. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.7(a) (eff. June 9, 1992) (17 Tex. Reg. 3842). The proposed
version of this rule included a statement that successor liability may be incurred by a person
purchasing a separate division, branch or identifiable segment of a business. See 34 TEX. AD-
MIN. CODE § 3.7(e) (proposed Mar. 3, 1992, 17 Tex. Reg. 1597).
228. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.7(d).
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of a business or stock of goods by a bankruptcy trustee or by the administra-
tor, executor or guardian in an estate or probate proceedings is not subject to
the successor liability provision. 229 Comptroller representatives have indi-
cated, however, that the comptroller is considering the possibility of at-
tempting to impose successor liability on buyers who purchase assets
through a bankruptcy trustee. 230
Over thirty rules of practice and procedure were reissued during 1992 as
part of the comptroller's efforts to revise and review his administrative
rules,2 3' so it remains necessary to review not only statutory provisions that
authorize taxpayers to contest their tax liability, 232 but also these
regulations.
229. Id. § 3.7(h).
230. This approach, which would be inconsistent with prior comptroller policy, would also
be subject to challenge based on bankruptcy laws.
231. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1.1, 1.2, 1.4-1.9. (Many of these rules were revised, effec-
tive as of Feb. 26, 1992, although some of these procedural rules were not revised during the
Survey period. See 17 Tex. Reg. 1313).
232. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 112.052, 112.151 (Vernon 1992).
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